Shaping the future of cyber operations
In his 2013 book, “Cyber War Will Not Take Place” Thomas Rid argues, “cyber-operations in wartime are not as useful as bombs and missiles when it comes to inflicting the maximum amount of physical and psychological damage on the enemy.”
From day one of the Russian offensive, cyber experts and advocates have been looking for the « cyber » smoking gun in Ukraine. Russia is unarguably a “first class” country in cyberspace and probably one of the few countries skillful enough to launch destructive cyber-attacks to achieve its strategic goals in support of kinetic operations. Thus, as the crisis escalated before 24 February 2022, fear of a « cyber shock and awe » grew. However, so far, the Russo-Ukrainian war reminds us that war is still "flesh and steel" . Mud and geography still impose their rules, and logistics are critical to both sides. Does it mean that cyber operations are ineffective, too weak, and unable to produce any strategic value?